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The BP Gulf Oil Spill: Public and Corporate Governance Failures
Abstract
Purpose: To critically examine public and corporate governance failures that we argue
predisposed the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the worst environmental disaster in United
States (US) history.
Design/methodology/approach: A critical examination of publicly available documentation
to identify systemic governance flaws of a marketized government agency and BP’s selfregulated corporate governance.
Findings: The spill was overseen by the US Federal Government agency, Minerals
Management Service (MMS). Restructured by the Reagan Administration to mimic business,
the MMS regulated and collected revenue from offshore oil leases, a conflict of interest that
compromised this public agency’s integrity. Neo-classical economics and its political ally
neo-liberalism were instrumental in marketizing the public sector, which became the agency
for the ‘business of business regulation’ supporting regulatory capitalism’s ideal of the
market as the only way to organize society. Evidence also reveals weaknesses in BP’s
corporate governance as oversight of safety, health and the natural environment by various
sub-committees was conducted by a few directors with little transparency or public scrutiny.
Social implications: Instead of the State protecting society from the pernicious aspects of
capitalism, the State protected the markets from society. BPs’ corporate governance also
rewarded senior managers for chasing super profits and growth by exploiting workers and the
natural environment, while greenwashing BP reports to assuage numerous scandals.
Originality/value: The application of a theoretical framework linking neo-managerialism of
the public service and regulatory capitalism of corporate regulation to a critical examination
of the systemic governance failures that failed to protect the public commons for the public
good.
Key words: BP, marketized public service, self-regulation, corporate governance
Paper type: Conceptual
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An Examination of Public and Corporate Governance Failures: The BP Gulf Oil Spill

1. Introduction
On 20 April 2010, an explosion and fire sank the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of
Mexico (GOM) Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), killing 11 workers and setting off one of the
worst offshore oil spills in United States (US) history (King 2010). The oil well was owned
by BP, while Transocean owned the rig and Halliburton had cemented the well. The
companies blamed each other for the catastrophe while efforts to plug the leak continued for
several weeks and then months. Estimates for the oil spill ranged from 35,000 to 60,000
barrels of oil per day 1 gushing into the Gulf (King, 2010). This disaster has put the safety of
deep-water oil drilling under review in the US, despite President Obama’s continued public
commitment to offshore oil drilling (Sutherland, 2010). Estimates suggest about 5 million
barrels of oil (or 210 million gallons) gushed into the Gulf waters and 500,000 tons of gas
were released over the 86 days of leakage (Guarino, 2010; Juhasz, 2011), destroying
hundreds of kilometers of fragile coastlines and threatening the livelihoods of the local
population. The well responsible for the Gulf oil spill was finally sealed on 19 September
2010 (Guarino, 2010). Some observers have questioned whether oil can be extracted safely
under water, while others blamed BP’s woes on a culture of cost-cutting and outsourcing
citing previous problems in the Gulf, Azerbaijan, Alaska, and Texas City (see for example
Bower, 2009; Mufson, 2010; Webb, 2010).

To pacify the US public, President Obama announced plans to hold BP accountable while
likening the catastrophe to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks for its potential to
profoundly affect US domestic policy (Mann, 2010). Estimates suggest that BP could face up
1

Estimates varied widely as BP provided conservative estimates in an effort to minimise their liability, as
opposed to more accurate estimates from independent scientists (see Jahasz, 2011 for a full discussion).
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to $80 billion (updated to $100 billion) in costs, including penalties, damages and clean-up
costs. Beyond the financial costs the company could also face tougher scrutiny from
regulators and reduced opportunities to drill wells (Mouawad & Krauss, 2010). While the US
public watched the face-off between BP and the US government, Brooks (2010) argued that
essentially these two parties were on the same side. Indeed as articulated by Tony Hayward,
the then BP Group Chief Executive (GCE):
“We continue to show our ability to take on and manage risk, doing the difficult
things that others either can’t do or choose not to do. This is why we are able to form
such strong relationships with governments” (BP Annual Report, 2009, p.7).

Prior to the GOM oil spill, BP was one of the parties infamously connected to the Exxon
Valdez spill in Prince William Sound in March 1989 that resulted in more than 11 million
gallons of crude oil being discharged into the waters of Alaska’s gulf coast (Patten, 1992). As
a consequence of the Exxon Valdez spill approximately 200 lawsuits were filed in state and
federal courts in Alaska seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Most of the lawsuits
named Exxon, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska)which operated the oil terminal
at Valdez, and the other companies that owned Alyeska as being responsible for the oil spill
that required more than $2 billion to be spent on the cleanup effort (Patten, 1992). At the time
BP owned a 50% interest in Alyeska through a subsidiary of BP America Inc. and briefly
indirectly owned a further 20% interest in Alyeska following BP’s combination with Atlantic
Richfield (BP Annual Report, 2007). While the grounding of the Exxon Valdez in 1989 led to
considerable public pressure on US oil companies concerning the natural environmental,
Patten (1998) found that the Alaskan oil spill also triggered substantial increases in both
wholesale and retail gasoline prices that appeared to be interpreted as good news for the intraindustry firms, despite increased legislation. More importantly;
The Exxon Valdez oil spill led to the development of The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA90) in the US, with its innovative protection of coastal waters from oil pollution,
enforcement mechanisms, including contingency planning to prevent spills, and
4

insistence upon the principle that “the polluter pays”, not only for the actual costs of a
clean-up, but also for damage to the public’s natural resources (Ornitz & Champ,
2002, p. 89).

Increased public outcry about the safety of US waters and insistence upon the protection of
the world’s marine environments, particularly coastal ecosystems has helped to shape the
legislative, judicial and regulatory climate of the US today, but to what effect? As articulated
by Hopwood (2009), much can be done to lessen some of the major environmental concerns
if there is a will to act.
“But that will is only weakly developed in most countries of the world and in most
spheres of life. It certainly has been largely absent at the political and the corporate
levels. … All too often the desire to act has only found a verbal expression, action
itself being more influenced by political infighting and corporate lobbying and
influence. Even now, as the findings of environmentalists and scientists get ever more
certain and disturbing, the vast majority of politicians still have difficulty in
responding, continuing to put what they see as their short-term economic and political
imperatives above the longer term interests of the human race” (Hopwood, 2009, p.
433).

The purpose of this paper therefore, is to critically examine systemic governance flaws of a
marketized government agency and BP’s self-regulated corporate governance that we argue
predisposed the BP oil spill in the GOM, OCS. Specifically, we investigate the compromised
and at times corrupted State regulation of the US oil and gas industry, exacerbated by a
marketized public service restructured by the neoliberal Reagan administration during the
early 1980’s. We contend that this restructure ideologically supplanted, and then undermined,
the public interest with regulatory capitalism - a market oriented system that supports the
business interests above the public interest and commons. The study then examines the role
of BP’s governance in a history of accidents that implicates the role of accounting as senior
managers chased super profits and growth for their ‘glorified self-interest’. We conclude that
the marketized public governance protected the markets from society, rather than protecting
society from the pernicious aspects of the markets. Evidence also indicates that private
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governance failed, that is BP’s board and its various sub-committees charged with monitoring
the safety, health and the natural environment failed in their responsibilities.

2. Marketized public governance and regulatory capitalism
In this section we develop a theoretical framework linking neo-managerialism of the
public service and regulatory capitalism of corporate regulation to a critical
examination of the systemic governance failures to protect the public commons for the
public good. The moral reasons for the regulation of business by democratic government are
social justice, the protection of society and the commons from pernicious aspects of
capitalism and the markets (Terry, 2005). Abraham Lincoln’s ideal of representative
democracy as “… government of the people, by the people, for the people …” (Wills, 1992)
invoke deontological universal values of equality, liberty, and respect for people, human
rights and the public good. In recent decades, governments have been co-opted by powerful
corporate and business interests that actively aim to transform the public good and commons
into a free market, privately owned utopia (Friedman, 1962), where fundamentalist
individualism is fostered by an ethic of ‘rational’ but egoistic self-interest - ‘man is an end in
himself’ (The Ayn Rand Institute 2, www.aynrand.org).

Economist Milton Friedman receiving the Nobel Prize in 1976 heralded the shrinking of the
post-war Keynesian welfare state and the growth of neo-classical economics and its political
ally, neo-liberalism. The Keynesian welfare state is epitomised by U.S. President F.D.
Roosevelt’s New Deal (1932-36) that strengthened and protected the wider public good by
institutionalizing social justice, affirming human rights, social solidarity and the ethic of care.
The New Deal of State intervention and control met basic human needs after the collapse of
2

One of America’s most powerful public officials, Alan Greenspan Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of
the United States (1986-2006), is not only a devotee but was also a close confident of Ayn Rand.
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laissez-faire capitalism no longer assured economic and social stability following the 1929
Wall Street Crash (Abramovitz, 2011). The Crash brought misery to millions of people who
lost their savings, their jobs and their dignity. The social and economic instability wrought by
the Crash had lasting detrimental social, economic and psychological effects felt worldwide
culminating in the death and destruction inflicted by World War II. A reflection of the postwar Keynesian welfare state, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and
proclaimed by the United Nations’ (UN) General Assembly in 1948 as a response to the
calamitous Great Depression (1930-1938) and World War II (1939-1945). The preamble of
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts
which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort,
to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by
the rule of law,”

From 1950 to the early 1970’s government spending supported a period of unprecedented
egalitarian economic growth in an era of State capitalism (Chomsky & Dosanni, 2009). After
nearly three decades of hard won peace and prosperity amidst cold war tensions, the
Keynesian welfare state 3 was blamed for not dealing with economic crises ostensibly from
two oil shocks and the huge cost of U.S. military intervention and defeat in Vietnam during
the 1960’s and 1970’s. In addition, the collapse of the Breton Woods arrangements 4 (1945 1971) gave market fundamentalists and their political allies the opportunity to implement
3

Radical monetary policies advocated by neo-classical economists such as Milton Friedman (1968), were
introduced to energize the stagflating U.S. economy under monetary expansion pressure (MacFarlane, 2006).
4
U.S. President Nixon (1969-1974) floated the U.S. dollar in a bid to reduce inflation by eliminating the gold
standard in 1971, but resulted in the Breton Woods breakdown.
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reforms that lifted restrictions on finance, allowing speculative booms (Chomsky & Dosanni,
2009). Boin and ′t Hart‘s (2003, p. 549) analysis of public leadership in times of crises found
that political leaders use, and in some instances create momentum for, governmental reform
efforts, as“an exercise in creative destruction” as “old structures must be destroyed before
new ones can be implemented”.

Governments led by market fundamentalists gained political power in the 1970’s and 1980’s.
These market fundamentalists forcefully and skilfully argued that democratic socialism and
the Keynesian welfare state had failed; thus justifying their determination to change the
values of the State from protecting society from the market, to protecting the market from
society (Terry, 2005). Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) stated that society does
not exist and that only competitive, wealth-seeking individuals matter. This statement began
the large scale social and public disinvestment through privatization and deregulation,
followed by the emasculation of the public service now viewed as a deficit. “Ideas of
transformation, revolution, reinvention and cultural change have become a sustained theme
and political rhetoric ever since Thatcherism displaced the political left by the political right
as an agency of radicalism” (Clark & Newman, 1997, p. 34). Thatcher’s ally US President
Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) came to power supported by neo-liberal proponents who
valorized the primacy of the private over the public (Clarke, 2004; Quiggan, 2005) by
advocating the welfare state as an impediment to free markets (Jilberto & Mommen, 2002).
As President Reagan quipped, “Government is like a baby, an alimentary canal with a big
appetite at one end and no responsibility at the other.” Further, “Welfare’s purpose should be
to eliminate, as far as possible, the need for its own existence” (Das, 2011).
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Reagan was also supported by the ‘Family’ or the ‘Fellowship’, a powerful and shadowy
organisation founded in the United States in the 1930s to promote a gospel of theocratic
capitalist power and American empire. Like a Protestant version of Opus Dei, the Fellowship
is best known for founding the National Prayer Breakfast in Washington DC. The Fellowship
is basically theocratic in impulse and deeply hostile to democracy, believing democratic
government and secularism generally to be a manifestation of ungodly pride. Over decades it
has managed to penetrate to the very centre of American political power by preaching a
gospel of American power. Its invisible network has not only penetrated the highest levels of
political power in the United States, but wherever in the world America has political or
economic interests. This opaque network of fundamentalist Christian business groups, mainly
in the oil and aerospace/defence industries see God’s interests as those of absolute free
markets evident in “macho, muscular Christianity” that tends to serve the interests of the
network. Further this network is vehemently opposed to what they see as socialism i.e.
public, social and environmental investment, unionism and feminism (Sharlet, 2008).

Regardless of the wishes of domestic electorates and public resistance to privatization
worldwide (Hall, Lobina & De La Motte, 2005) governments initiated policies that
transformed economic and social institutions. Often this was at the insistence of, or
governments were persuaded by, powerful pro neo-liberal technocrats in the World Bank 5,
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Clarke,
2004; Quiggan, 2005). Underlying neo-liberalism is the dominant ideology of the political

5

Robert B. Zoellick is a Bush presidential appointee to the World Bank, following the scandalous resignation of
another Bush appointee and architect of the Iraq war, Paul Wolfowitz. From 1993 to 1997, Mr. Zoellick served
as an Executive Vice President at Fannie Mae, the largest housing finance investor in the U.S. and was
instrumental in its privatisation. Fannie Mae, a victim of the sub-prime collapse lost billions of dollars and had
to be re-nationalized.
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and economic power 6-holding technocracy with “a market intention to fundamentally reshape
society and to transform its most profound relations” Szalai’s diary (as cited in Jilberto &
Mommen, 2002). As the public sphere became emaciated (Neimark, 1995), private investors
awash with funds, scoured the globe for investment opportunities artificially pushing up the
asset values and at the same time reinforcing the financialization 7 of society dominated by
capital and commodity markets.

Using the competiveness rhetoric, government decree dismantled public institutions built up
over several generations through privatizations, deregulation or corporatization (Clarke,
2004). The public service became the focus of reform, as market fundamentalist politicians
implemented management technologies compatible with the ‘new so-called Schumpeterian
workfare state’ (Cohn, 1997; Jessop, 1993; Terry, 2005). Traditional public administration
practices of the Keynesian welfare state that had protected the public interest were replaced
with management technologies euphemistically centred on financial management control,
called New Public Management (NPM) (Terry, 2005).
“New Public Management philosophy and practices have contributed to a
phenomenon described as the thinning of administrative institutions. Thin institutions
are weak; they lack the capacity for good administration—a requirement for
maintaining the American people’s confidence in government” (p. 426).

‘The public service’ was replaced by the ‘public sector’ as a provider of public services often
tendered from the private or public sectors, but funded by the taxpayer through government
(Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008). As the provision of public services was outsourced to the
6

“Neoclassical theorists are unable to account for power, because they assume a perfectly ergodic (certain)
world. When neoclassical economists do deal with power - albeit superficially - it is usually tied to the existence
of an imperfection, which leads to suboptimal results” (Monvoison & Rochon, 2007 p.8).
7
“Changes in capitalism over the last three decades have been commonly characterized using a trio of terms:
neo-liberalism, globalization, and financialization ... less attention is given to the third. ... The financialization of
capitalism - the shift in gravity of economic activity from production (and even from much of the growing
service sector) to finance - is thus one of the key issues of our time (Foster, 2007, p.1). ... The great
agglomerations of wealth seem to be increasingly related to finance rather than production, and finance more
and more sets the pace and the rules for the management of the cash flow of nonfinancial firms ...” (Foster,
2007, p 7.).
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private sector, regulatory oversight became paramount rather than traditional public
governance.
“The regulatory framework is intended to manage the nature of the various services
and ensure that the suppliers of these services do not abuse their power to provide
services that citizens have little option but to use” (Broadbent & Guthrie 2008, p.
136).

The public service transitioned to a market orientation diminishing its publicness and blurring
“the boundaries between the private-public distinction, shrinking socioeconomic role
narrowing service recipients, worsening condition of accountability and a declining level of
public trust” (Haque, 2001, p.65). Although scholarly debate is far from over about the
origins of NPM, Terry (2005, p.430) states that
“there is at least general agreement on the theoretical foundation of NPM. Scholars
agree that managerialism (Enteman, 1993; Pollitt, 1990), public choice theory
(Buchanan & Tullock, 1962), transaction-cost economics (Williamson, 1995), and
principal-agent theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mitnick, 1975; T. Moe, 1984;
Wood, 1989) are important influences. The complex mixture of these theoretical
perspectives has produced what I describe elsewhere as the neo-managerialist
ideology or neo-managerialism (Terry, 1998a).
Neo-managerialism provides the philosophical foundation for two different
approaches associated with the NPM. The first of these, liberation management, is
based on the idea that public managers are competent and highly skilled individuals
familiar with good management practices. Consequently, managerial malfeasance is
not a plausible explanation for the supposed poor performance of public agencies. If
managerial incompetence does not explain the shortcomings of administrative
institutions, what does? Critics of liberation management offer a host of answers, but
its proponents give a clear, unambiguous response: The bureaucratic system, with its
burdensome rules, controls, and procedures, is largely responsible for poor
government performance.”

Mimicking their private sector counterparts, new public managers eliminated many rules and
regulations in their zeal to achieve efficiencies and competitive performance; thereby failing
to recognize the importance of rules and regulations to strengthen the integrity of public
administrative institutions (Terry, 2005). Accounting was central to legitimising public
services into a market or quasi-market services needing contracts and employee performance
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incentives, which are explicitly managed top down with the emphasis on quantifying
efficiency and performance gains in the name of accountability (Lapsley, 1999). The
expansion of managerial freedom in newly created autonomous public agencies based on
business principles, diminished public accountability that lacked democratic scrutiny of
public debate, legislative committees and administrative tribunals (Haque, 2001).

An emasculated and marketized public ‘sector’ became the agency for the ‘business of
business regulation’ in support of regulatory capitalism’s ideal of a free market uninhibited
by regulation and the State. Regulatory capitalism is a sociological theory that views the
market as the best and only way to organise society, thus blurring the boundaries between the
state, markets and society (Levi-Faur, 2005). As a the spawn of neo-liberalism, regulatory
capitalism is based on the ideology of reduced reliance on state regulation for expected
efficiencies through fundamentalist ‘free-market’ capitalist mechanisms, such as competition,
unfettered markets, minimal taxes and little government intervention (Friedman, 1962;
Hayek, 1986/2002). Thus, the US oil and gas industry is overseen by a flawed regulatory
structure introduced by the Reagan Administration during the early 1980’s (for a full history
of US oil and gas regulation see the Report to the President, National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon, January, 2011).
“In January 1982, President Reagan’s Interior Secretary, James Watt, created the
Minerals Management Service (MMS) in support of his goal to open unprecedented
reaches of U.S. territorial waters to oil and gas exploration. MMS had a conflicting
and ultimately disastrous mandate: to both regulate offshore energy leases and collect
the revenue they generated” (Oil Spill Commission, 2011, p.66).

Rather than regulation being administered by a publicly funded independent public service
guided by a democratically elected government, politicians were instrumental in partly or
wholly self-regulating industries ridden with conflicts of interest. Regulatory capitalism
manifests in regulatory agencies often controlled by political appointees or outsourced to
12

non-elected ‘experts’, from the very industry being regulated thus serving business. Kennedy
(2007) points out several questionable Bush administration appointees:
“Most insidiously, the president (Bush) has put representatives of polluting industries
or environmental skeptics in charge of virtually all the agencies responsible for
protecting America from pollution. Some egregious officials are now gone, often
returning to the private sector whose interests they served. But the administrators who
remain in place continue to carry the torch—people such as Mark Rey, a timberindustry lobbyist appointed to oversee the U.S. Forest Service; Rejane “Johnnie”
Burton, at Interior, a former oil-and-gas-company executive in Wyoming, who has
failed to collect billions on leases from oil companies active in the Gulf of Mexico; and
Elizabeth Stolpe, a former lobbyist for one of the nation’s worst polluters, Koch
Industries, who is an associate director (for toxics and environmental protection) at the
White House Council on Environmental Quality. …
Reports in The New York Times and on 60 Minutes have highlighted the case of Phillip
Cooney, who was the chief of staff for the White House Council on Environmental
Quality. His job was to advise the president on the environmental implications of
decisions that he makes. Cooney’s previous job had been as the chief lobbyist for the
American Petroleum Institute. His preoccupation during his four-year White House
stint, according to news accounts, was combing scientific documents issued by the
various federal agencies in order to remove damaging statements about the oil industry
and the coal industry. He suppressed or altered several major studies on global
warming in order to protect the interests of his former clients. After the Times revealed
the alterations, in 2005, Cooney left his job and went to work for ExxonMobil.”

Regulatory agencies are funded mainly by the very industry they are overseeing in a tacit
client relationship, thus compromising their independence and introducing conflicts of
interest. In addition, the regulated are able to control the regulator through economic power
“he who pays the piper calls the tune”; that subverts and corrupts the regulation to suit the
business objectives of profit, rather than the public good. The oil industry has a long history
of influencing the US government regarding regulatory oversight (Priest, 2007) and
environmental disclosures (Cho, Chen & Roberts, 2008). For example, Mayer (2010)
describes the embodiment of the US oil industry, billionaire Koch brothers with Christian
right leanings as:
“… longtime libertarians who believe in drastically lower personal and corporate
taxes, minimal social services for the needy, and much less oversight of industry—
especially environmental regulation. These views dovetail with the brothers’ corporate
interests. In a study released this spring, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst’s
13

Political Economy Research Institute named Koch Industries one of the top ten air
polluters in the United States. And Greenpeace issued a report identifying the
company as a “kingpin of climate science denial.” The report showed that, from 2005
to 2008, the Kochs vastly outdid ExxonMobil in giving money to organizations
fighting legislation related to climate change, underwriting a huge network of
foundations, think tanks, and political front groups.”

However, the Koch Brothers like many other oil companies build reputations for upstanding
corporate citizenship by donating to charities and supporting various community causes,
while at the same time destroying swathes of the environment by polluting the air, land and
water (Chen, 2010; Mayer, 2010). Hence, the US Federal regulators’ oversight of the oil and
gas industry was essentially self-regulated overseen by an ethically comprised MMS, an
agency of the Department of the Interior (DOI). As Lehner, Director of the Natural Resource
Defence Council argued:
“We shouldn’t be surprised that corporations are trying to increase their profits. That is
what they do. But what is surprising is how free BP was to do as it pleased.
We know BP will act in its own interest, but where were representatives of the
American people’s interests in the Gulf—our health, fisheries, natural heritage? Where
were the forces that hold polluters and bad actors in check? Where were the regulators?
… In the world of offshore oil drilling, those conditions didn’t exist. Dedicated
regulators were grossly underfunded and stripped of effective enforcement tools, while
the rest were too cosy with the industry they were charged with overseeing.” (Lehner
& Deans, 2010).

2.1 US public policy, oil, money, power and greed
On December 20, 2006, President George Bush signed into law The Gulf of Mexico Energy
Security Act (GOMESA) of 2006 (Pub. Law 109-432), which overrode The Oil Pollution Act
of 1990. Following this legislation the President lifted US bans on offshore drilling that were
enacted in 1990 after the catastrophic Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. President Bush
argued that the main reason for allowing deep water oil drilling in the GOM OCS was to
lower the oil price for American citizens. Energy security was also put forward as a reason, as
the US requires oil to wage wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to also defend US oil interests
14

in the Persian Gulf – deemed the ‘hidden cost’ of oil (Delucci & Murphy, 2008). BP has
benefited from the Iraq war as highlighted in their 2009 BP sustainability review (p. 2).
“How significant is BP’s deal in Iraq? Our deal to increase production from the
Rumaila field is significant in several ways. It gives us a great opportunity to work
with the people of Iraq and our partner China National Petroleum Company to develop
one of the world’s great oilfields. We see this as the beginning of a long-term
relationship that will be instrumental in helping Iraq to rebuild its economy after years
of war and sanctions. The investment in Rumaila will support Iraq in achieving its
ambition of becoming a major player in global oil markets once again and will catalyse
training and development opportunities for the many thousands of Iraqis working in
Rumaila.”

A backroom deal that has changed the original contract with Iraq’s Ministry of Oil has given
BP a stranglehold on the Iraq’s economy (95% of Iraq’s foreign earnings) as reported in the
Observer (Macalister, 31 July, 2011).
“Section 12.5 of this revised technical service contract shows that BP and its Chinese
partner CNPC can obtain payments for “government imposed curtailment” – which
could cover quota demands made on Iraq by Opec. This also applies to disruption to
the transport of oil – “curtailments of transporter to receive net production at the
transfer point through no fault of the contractor or operator”.
The section goes on to say that in the event of such disruptions “the parties shall agree
in good faith a mechanism to fully compensate [the] contractor as soon as practicable,
which may include, among other things, a revised field production schedule or an
extension to the term or payment of lost income in respect of the estimated volumes
not produced during the period”.
The changes are likely to anger internal critics of the Baghdad regime, many of whom
were suspicious of the original deal. It will also increase the prejudice of those who
saw the UK’s involvement in toppling Saddam as part of a “war for oil”.
BP was also the largest oil producer and leading resource holder in the deepwater GOM as
reported by then CEO Tony Haywood (BP Annual Report, 2009). He stated that BP’s
“priorities have remained absolutely consistent – safety, people and performance” yet also
reports that BP is “now the largest producer in deepwater fields globally. In the Gulf of
Mexico we ramped up production at Thunder Horse to more than 300,000 barrels of oil
equivalent per day. Production started from Atlantis Phase 2, Dorado and King South. And in
September we announced the Tiber discovery, the deepest oil and gas discovery well ever
15

drilled” (p.6).

Meanwhile US policy makers appear to have little intention of moving away from fossil fuel
to carbon-reducing alternatives, indicating that oil and gas will provide the ‘lion’s share’ of
the nation’s energy for the foreseeable future.
“Domestic petroleum production is continuing to decline and imports are continuing to
increase. The forecasts by the National Petroleum Council and others project that
domestic consumption over the next 5 years and beyond will increase substantially.
While alternative sources are expected to contribute a growing portion of the Nation’s
domestic energy production, no new technology is forecast to make a paradigmshifting contribution to domestic energy production in the next 15 years. Crude oil and
natural gas are expected to provide the lion’s share of the Nation’s energy for the
foreseeable future. The OCS is one of the largest suppliers of crude oil for the United
States, and is the third largest supplier of natural gas, after Texas and Alaska. Without
the huge increase in deepwater oil and gas production from the GOM OCS since 1995,
the recent decline in domestic production would have been twice as severe. The
Nation’s current and projected energy situation will require continued leasing,
exploration, and development of OCS lands in an environmentally sound manner.”
(Minerals Management Service, 2007, p. 80).

The US imports 65% of its oil, even though it is the third largest oil producer in the world
after Saudi Arabia and Russia (Grove, Burgelman & Schifrin, 2008). Grove et al. (2008)
point out that many community groups and conservationists were against the opening up of
the GOM due to its close proximity to the fragile Louisiana wetlands, the habitat for the fish
and shrimp spawning grounds that support the largest fishing industry in the US, as well as
several endangered flora and fauna (Nixon et al., 2009). For example
“Restore or Retreat (Louisiana) comments that without adequate mitigation and a
significant, steady funding mechanism in place to address development that is on the
brink of economic and environmental disaster, this non-profit coastal advocacy group
is opposed to the MMS plan. The hurricanes were evidence of inadequate planning and
mitigation techniques.
Sierra Club et al comments on behalf of millions of members, and raises eight points of
concern, in opposing the MMS program. (1.) New Administrative Boundaries are
inequitable, illegal, not subject to proper notice and comment and unacceptable. (2.)
The 5-year plan should not include any areas protected by moratoria or executive
withdrawal. (3.) Such areas should be granted permanent protection. (4.) No permits
for “air gun” inventories should be issued for protected areas. (5.) “Gas-Only-Leasing”
16

proposals are inappropriate and deceptive because they open the door for oil drilling.
(6.) Retroactive application of a pre-existing EIS for a prior Lease Sale #181 proposal
would fail to address many important concerns, namely the well-known “Loop 125
Currents” in the GOM. (7.) Alaska OCS Leasing proposals would endanger a wide
range of resources of national significance. (8.) Lack of Attention to Protecting Living
Resources and the “Royalty relief” provisions enacted in the EP Act of 2005 fail to
meet the test of ensuring fair return for the U.S. taxpayer. (9.) No acknowledgement of
the Carbon-Constrained Future. (10.) Growing scandals over MMS giveaway of
taxpayer-owned U.S. resources to the oil industry. This comment opposes most aspects
of the MMS proposal” (Minerals Management Service, 2007, p. 124).

The MMS was responsible for implementing the requirements of the Act. Section 18 of the
Act called for the preparation of the oil and gas leasing program indicating a 5-year schedule
of lease sales (2007-2012), designed to meet the Nation’s energy needs in the newly opened
deep water GOM. The MMS in fact had several conflicting responsibilities as stated in its
2009 report:
“The Minerals Management Service is a responsible steward of U.S. offshore
resources by ensuring the receipt of fair market value for the sale of leases,
encouraging conservation, evaluating and approving new technology, and regulating
drilling and production” (Nixon et al., 2009 p. xi).

The US government received significant income from the auctioning of GOM oil leases to
the tune of $67 billion dollars in 2008, with 50% allocated to the US Treasury General Fund,
37.5% to the four Gulf oil and gas producing States of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and
Texas, and 12.5% to the land and water conservation fund (see Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation and Enforcement: http://www.boemre.gov/offshore). The auction of
oil and gas leases in now accessible deep water GOM produced a bonanza for the US
government. The net benefits from the Central GOM oil and gas program for 2007-2012 was
expected to be $US99.52 billion, and from the Western GOM to be $US44.44 billion.
However, environmental costs were calculated at a meagre $US0.34 billion in 2007 as
reported in DOI, Minerals Management Service (MMS), April 2007 Report (Table 6 p. 84).
Hence, on the one hand the US government received monies for the auction of leases from
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the oil and gas companies, but with the other hand gave the oil and gas companies major
royalty relief for the GOM OCS. Intense lobbying by the oil and gas companies successfully
persuaded the Clinton administration to give major royalty relief under the Outer Shelf Deep
Water Royalty Relief Act 1995 to promote deep water (1000 feet or more) oil and gas
production. The New York Times (26 December, 2006) highlighted a report commissioned
by the MMS that stated:
“projects that over a 40-year period beginning in 2003, the incentive program would
lead to the discovery of only 1.1 percent more oil reserves than would be found with
no incentives at all. This is a tiny impact that is far exceeded by swings in market
prices, which have much more to do with whether a company is willing to risk millions
of dollars on what could turn out to be dry holes.”

The MMS is responsible for collecting oil and gas royalties. However this US government
agency has estimated that foregone royalty relief could be as high as $US80 billion in 2004,
as testified by the United States Government Accountability Office (USGOA) before the US
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (18 January, 2007). The USGOA (2007)
reported that the implementation and administration of the royalty relief provisions by the
MMS were problematic, marred by inept record keeping, inconsistent enforcement and
bureaucratic incompetence. The USGOA pointed to the MMS allowing companies to escape
billions in royalties that they would otherwise have paid for 1998 and 1999 GOM OCS
leases. The MMS also had the option of taking a percentage of the actual oil and natural gas,
and selling it to themselves or using it for other reasons, such as filling the nation’s strategic
petroleum reserve. The MMS referred to this option as ‘taking royalties in kind’ (USGOA,
2007).

The MMS not only received monies from the oil companies for the auction of GOM leases,
but also performed the environmental impact studies of the GOM OCS. For example, see
MMS “Gulf of Mexico OCS Oil and Gas Lease Sales: 2009-2012 Central Planning Area
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Sales 208, 213, 216, and 222, Western Planning Area Sales 210, 215, and 218, Final
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement” (September, 2008). This regulatory
structural flaw created a conflict of interest where the same government agency is receiving
substantial funding from the auction of oil and gas leases, but at the same time evaluates the
environmental impact of those auctioned leases. Disgraced bankers Lehman Brothers 8 are
also quoted by this MMS (2008) environmental impact study:
“Lehman analysts believe that they (oil and gas companies) have recently become more
attracted to unconventional gas plays and that increased competition abroad from
national oil companies and limited access to some areas of the world is pushing the
majors back to the United States (One Offshore, 2005b; 20:9). … Interest in deepwater
oil and gas production continues to grow, with 67 percent of all blocks receiving bids in
water depths greater than 400 m (1,312 ft)” (Minerals Management Service Gulf of
Mexico OCS, 2008, p. 3-78).

The MMS allocation for environmental damage was inadequate considering the extent of the
BP oil spill damage to the large environmentally sensitive areas of the South Eastern US,
including the Louisiana wetlands and the Mississippi Delta. These areas are home to several
endangered flora and fauna as well the largest US fishing ground that has yet to be fully
accounted for. To ensure adequate funds for the clean-up, President Obama’s administration
pressured BP to suspend its dividend for the year (2010) and agree to a $US20 billion oil
fund. In fact the cost to BP so far is about $US40 billion and counting. The Guardian reported
that:
“In late July BP set aside $32.2bn to cover the cost of the clean-up, more than the City
had expected, a move which pushed the company into a record loss of $17bn for the
second quarter of 2010. At that time, though, the Macondo well was still leaking oil
into the ocean, and was only finally shut off in mid-September.
Richard Hunter, head of UK equities at Hargreaves Lansdown Stockbrokers, said the
additional $7.7bn provision was ‘a stark reminder that the fallout from the spill will
follow BP for some considerable time to come’.

8

Lehman Brothers Bank collapsed in September 2008, the largest bankruptcy ever filed, amid accusations of
securities and accounting fraud that precipitated the global financial crisis (Valukas, 2010).
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The final cost of one of the worst environmental disasters ever could climb further. BP said
that the total charge of $39.9bn was its ‘current best estimate of those costs that can be
reliably measured at this time” (Weardon, 2 November, 2010). As the MMS April 2007 study
stated:
“The immediate environmental risks of OCS oil and gas activities are borne
primarily by producing regions and nearby onshore areas, while some of the financial
consequences of those risks (e.g., financial losses due to unprofitable endeavors,
compensation by responsible parties for natural resource damage and payments into
funds established to provide compensation for losses not attributable to specific
parties) are shared by companies and individuals throughout the Nation.” (Minerals
Management Service U.S. Department of the Interior, April 2007, p. 96).

A Congressional Research Report disclosed that the MMS were able to provide BP with
environmental exceptions for their deep water drilling in Central GOM. Hence “Had this
project occurred in a different geographical area, including the eastern area of the Gulf of
Mexico, it would have undergone a higher level of environmental scrutiny” (Alexander, June
2010).

2.2 Regulatory capitalism compromises the MMS
We argue that the flawed regulatory structure and political appointees are evidence of
regulatory capitalism that compromised the MMS’s oversight of the GOM OCS oil fields.
The flawed MMS oversight is evidenced in the LA Times Editorial (May 28, 2010) that
reported MMS inspectors accepting meals and gifts from the companies whose work they
were overseeing in the Gulf of Mexico. Moreover:
“less than two years ago, a report revealed that employees at the Denver office were
engaging in sex and using drugs with energy company representatives in addition to
accepting gifts from them — all while overseeing billions of dollars worth of contracts.
The agency has conflict of interest written into its very job description: It collects
royalties for mineral leases at the same time that it recommends which leases should be
granted, and then oversees the safety and environmental soundness of the projects. Its
position on new Arctic oil exploration leases — suspended Thursday by President
Obama — was evidence enough that the Minerals Management Service had lost its
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sense of mission. The agency never studied what would happen in the case of a
catastrophic oil spill in the Arctic because it assumed the chances of such a thing
happening were too remote. That's the same decision it made on BP’s Deepwater
Horizon project”.

The ethicality of the MMS was under scrutiny as many congressional and internal
investigations have found this oversight agency to be badly mismanaged and at times corrupt.
Shockingly the New York Times (14 May, 2010) reported,
“The minerals service short-circuited the process when it granted hundreds of recent
drilling permits, according to documents and current and former government officials.
The BP well that blew in the gulf in April was granted an exemption from the
assessment process because company officials assured regulators that it carried little
hazard. Officials went along with the company and granted the permit.
The minerals agency also routinely overruled its staff biologists and engineers who
raised concerns about the safety and the environmental impact of certain drilling
proposals in the gulf and in Alaska, according to a half-dozen current and former
agency scientists. Those scientists said they were also regularly pressured by agency
officials to change the findings of their internal studies if they predicted that an
accident was likely to occur or if wildlife might be harmed.”

Other instances of MMS’s lack of ethicality include one of its own auditors blowing the
whistle on one major company cheating millions of royalty dollars in 2006. This auditor was
reorganised out of the MMS and he subsequently sued the cheating oil company (Andrews,
2006). In fact since the agency’s inception in 1982 by the Reagan Administration, it was
criticised only six years later for bad auditing practices and not collecting billions of dollars
of outstanding royalties from gas and oil companies (New York Times, 5 October 1988).
Like a bad seed, the structural flaws of this agency stemmed from the neo-liberal Reagan
administration that introduced regulatory capitalism, where the regulator and the regulated
industries became dependently interlocked in complex economic and administrative
relationships that support vested interests.

In 2006, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) instigated three separate investigations into
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allegations of corrupt MMS employees. The US Department of Interior Office of the
Inspector General (9 September, 2008) reported to the MMS that he found a culture of ethical
failure. For example, over 1/3 of the MMS royalty in kind staff socialised with, and received
a wide array of gifts and gratuities from the oil and gas companies with whom these MMS
staff members were doing business (United States Department of Interior Office of Inspector
General, 9 September. 2008).

Clearly the flawed regulation of the gas and oil industry, provided by the inept and sometimes
corrupt MMS failed in their oversight duties to prevent the catastrophic BP GOM oil spill in
April 2010, not long after the BP Texas oil refinery exploded disastrously in March 2005. On
June 21, 2010, the MMS was fundamentally restructured and renamed the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) as it underwent
reorganization and reform to split the agency, separating the officials who are responsible for
overseeing natural resource extraction from those who are charged with ensuring its safety
(see www.boemre.gov). Marketized public governance of the US gas and oil industry clearly
failed, but what was BP’ governance role?

3. BP’s Greenwash – a history of failed sustainability
Indeed BP has a long history of oil spill accidents that have cost human lives and also caused
catastrophic environmental damage, particularly since the 1990s. A little-reported giant gas
leak in Azerbaijan in September 2008 has recently emerged from leaked US embassy cables
(Webb, 2010). The leak occurred at the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshi (ACG) Field, Azerbaijan’s
largest producing oil field in the Caspian where vast undeveloped gas reserves are situated.
BP is the operator and largest shareholder in the consortium, which includes US companies
Chevron, ExxonMobil and Hess (formerly Amerada Hess), as well as Norwegian firm Statoil
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and Azerbaijani state owned oil company Socar. BP has been criticized by its partners in the
gas field for limiting the information it has made available about the accident, both to the
public and to its ACG partners. While BP was able to evacuate its 212 workers safely after
the accident, output was cut by 500,000 barrels a day with production disrupted for months.
In January 2009 BP blamed a “bad cement job” for the gas leak, which bears a resemblance
to Tony Hayward partly blaming a “bad cement job” by contractor Halliburton for the GOM
OCS incident. BP’s annual report does not mention this blowout, instead referring only to a
“subsurface gas release” (Juhasz, 2011). The President of Azerbaijan has also accused BP of
stealing $10 billion of oil reserves and using “mild blackmail” to secure the rights to develop
vast gas reserves in the Caspian Sea (Webb, 2010).

Other recent accidents occurred in March and August 2006, when BP Exploration (Alaska)
Inc (BPXA) had two major leaks of crude oil in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska due to corrosion of the
pipeline system. On 20 November 2007, BPXA entered into a criminal plea agreement with
the US Department of Justice (DOJ) relating to these accidents. BPXA pleaded guilty to a
misdemeanor violation of the US Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The penalty included
a three year term of probation that required BPXA to meet certain benchmarks relating to
replacement of its transit lines, upgrades to its leak detection system and improvements to its
integrity management program. On 31 March 2009, the DOJ filed a complaint against BPXA
seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief relating to these 2006 oil spills. The complaint
alleged violation of various federal environmental and pipeline safety statutes, and associated
regulations, as well as its maintenance and operation of the North Slope pipelines. The State
of Alaska also filed a complaint on the same date alleging BPXA’s corrosion management
practices violated various statutory, contractual and common law duties to the State, resulting
in penalty liability, damages for lost royalties and taxes, and liability for punitive damages
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(BP Annual Report, 2007). Prosecutors estimated that BP saved $9.6 million by not regularly
cleaning and inspecting the pipelines (Juhasz, 2011).

On 23 March 2005, an explosion and fire occurred at the BP Products’ Texas City refinery in
the isomerization unit as it was starting up after routine maintenance. The accident claimed
the lives of 15 workers and injured many others. BP Products has since resolved all civil
injury claims arising from the March 2005 incident. In March 2007, the US Chemical Safety
and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) issued its final report on the accident, which contained
recommendations to the Texas City refinery and to the Board of the company. On 25 October
2007, the DOJ announced that it had entered into a criminal plea agreement with BP Products
relating to the March 2005 accident. On 4 February 2008, BP Products pleaded guilty to one
felony violation of the risk management planning regulations promulgated under the US
Federal Clean Air Act. On 12 March 2009, the court accepted the plea agreement and BP
Products paid a $50 million criminal fine and was sentenced to three years’ probation.
Conditions of the probation included compliance with a 2005 US Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) settlement agreement, and an agreed order entered into with
the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (BP Annual Report, 2007). BP also paid a
fine of $21.3 million to OSHA to resolve more than 300 separate alleged violations of OSHA
safety regulations (BP Annual Report, 2005). A US government report into the accident
blamed systemic lapses in management, budget cuts and unacceptable maintenance (Bower,
2010).

In the wake of the 2005 Texas explosion, and on the recommendation of the US Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, the BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review
Panel (the Panel) was established in 2006 to review process safety management at the five
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US refineries and the culture of safety management. The Panel was however, chaired by the
former US Secretary of State, James A Baker III, once again indicating a close relationship
between BP and the US government (The BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review
Panel, 2007). The Panel issued its first report in January 2007 making 10 recommendations,
including consistent implementation of risk identification tools, improvements in incident
reporting and investigation systems, and enhancements to the group’s reporting and
monitoring programs (see BP Annual Report, 2007 p. 28). At the Panel’s recommendation in
May 2007 the Board appointed L Duane Wilson, who was a member of the Panel, as an
independent expert to monitor progress. The Panel reports directly to the BP Board’s Safety,
Ethics and Environment Assurance Committee. In 2006 BP also established the Group
Operations Risk Committee, chaired by Tony Haywood, to scrutinize the group’s safety
performance in implementing the operating management system that embraces the
recommendations made by the Panel in January 2007, essentially ensuring a system of selfregulation.

BP touts support for the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the global standard for corporate
sustainability reporting instituted by the United Nations and CERES. BP’s logo brazenly
advertises the company as a GRI sponsor in the latest G3 version of the standard (Lewis,
2010). At the same time Greenpeace recognized BP’s attempt to greenwash its brand by
awarding the company the first annual Greenpeace ‘Emerald Paintbrush’ award in 2008.
Greenpeace highlighted that under Tony Hayward GCE, BP had spent millions of dollars on
an advertising campaign announcing its commitment to alternative energy sources, using
slogans such as “from the earth to the sun, and everything in between” and “the best way out
of the energy fix is an energy mix”. In reality however, the company had allocated 93 per
cent, or $20 billion of its total investment fund for the development and extraction of oil, gas
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and other fossil fuels, while committing a mere 2.79 per cent to wind and 1.39 per cent to
solar power. Greenpeace also argued that in reality BP is one of the world’s largest corporate
emitters, with the company in 2007 releasing over 63 million tonnes of CO2 into the earth’s
atmosphere, roughly the equivalent of Portugal (Greenpeace, 2008).
“The Deepwater Horizon oil spill highlighted shortcomings of existing financial and
sustainability disclosure standards and practice. Viewed in retrospect, it is apparent
that both BP’s financial and sustainability reports veiled core weaknesses in how the
company managed pivotal issues of maintenance and safety. Assertions of NGOs that
BP‘s sustainability claims were greenwash came through with a vengeance.”

3.1 BP’s financial link to oil accidents and spill.
The BP GOM OCS oil spill is directly linked to short term financial decisions that caused
massive environmental and social damage, nearly wrecking the business. Teetering on the
brink of insolvency, BP was rescued by selling off assets and accepting maxima mea culpa at
the behest of the US government. BP reported during the 2010 financial year that it had taken
a total pre-tax charge of $40.9 billion in relation to the accident and spill. Hence BP was
forced to announce the sale of up to $30 billion of assets and by the end of 2010 had agreed
to almost $22 billion of disposals. The cancellation of three dividend payments to
shareholders was also made, as well as significant changes to the Board, to overcome the
threat to the very existence of the company (BP Annual Report, 2010).

We argue that a major reason for BP’s vulnerability to major oil spills and accidents is linked
to management’s chase for super growth and profits, boosted by severe cost cutting of
maintenance and safety, initiated by the ambitious and ruthless Lord Browne the then CEO
(1998–2007) 9. Accounting and BPs accountants are also implicated as accounting numbers
serve to justify decisions to pay excessive executive compensation, at the same time as firing
9

Since 2001, Lord Browne has been a crossbench member of the House of Lords. In 2007 he was fired by BP’s
Board for dishonesty in the High Court attempting to hide a messy breakup with a gay lover he met through the
internet. He also wanted to avoid Board and shareholder scrutiny about his lavish lifestyle funded by the
company. He left with 32 million pounds compensation and his reputation tarnished.
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thousands of workers, to achieve financial targets required by the Board and ultimately BP
shareholders. Accounting has distributive and hegemonic effects (Cooper & Sherer, 1984)
which reflect and perpetuate social injustices by “appraising the terms of exchange between
social constituencies (and by) arbitrating, evaluating, and adjudicating social choices”
(Tinker, 1985, p. 81). Moreover, any form of accounting has representational elements of a
particular social, political, and cultural context (Cooper & Sherer, 1984), and by extension,
main stream accounting represents the social, political, and cultural aspirations of capitalist
economics.

Hence, executive rewards are far from fair and just, as in BP’s remuneration policy that
stresses demanding performance targets for shareholder interests and profit generation.
“The remuneration committee’s reward policy reflects its aim to align executive
directors’ remuneration with shareholders’ interests and to engage world-class
executive talent for the benefit of the group. The main principles of the policy are:
•

Total rewards should be set at appropriate levels to reflect the competitive global
market in which BP operates.

•

The majority of the total reward should be linked to the achievement of demanding
performance targets.

•

Executive directors’ incentives should be aligned with the interests of ordinary
shareholders. This is achieved through setting performance targets that take
account of measures of shareholders’ interests and through the committee’s policy
that each executive director should hold a significant shareholding in the company,
equivalent in value to 5 x the director’s base salary.

•

The performance targets in the Executive Directors’ Incentive Plan should
encompass demanding comparisons of BP’s shareholder returns and earnings with
those of other companies in its own industry and in the broader marketplace.” (BP
Annual Report, 2004, p. 107).

This form of compensation encourages and is encouraged by the “glorification of selfinterest” or the “selfish syndrome” (Mintzberg, Simons & Basu, 2002, p. 67). Mintzberg et al.
(2002) criticize Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) narrow view of economic man or Homo
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economicus, where everyone and everything has a price and corporations exist to maximize
shareholder value achieved ostensibly by the ‘CEO as hero’. This pervasive “glorification of
self-interest” and ‘CEO as hero’ are examples of extreme individualism that have resulted in
senior executive pay and conditions exploding since the 1990’s, which continues today even
after recent asset bubble crashes have left a trail of economic and social devastation (Boyer,
2005; Stiglitz, 2010).

Governments have been successfully persuaded to leave executive pay to the market with
formal regulation designed for market efficiencies in an essentially self-regulated governance
system. Senior executives effectively pay themselves through lucrative compensation
contracts, supposedly linked to company performance, negotiated with compliant or passive
boards that abound with conflicts of interest. In effect, powerful and wealthy corporate elites
are able to arrange their compensation with minimum external oversight or transparency that
effectively firewalls senior management from an organisation’s internal labour norms and
values at the expense of the workers (Sikka, 2008). Rather than performance, evidence
indicates that the increase in senior executive pay is linked to increasing the firm size, even
when the firm’s market value is reduced which “could explain some of the vast amount of
inefficient expenditures of corporate resources on diversification programs that have created
large conglomerate organizations …” (Baker, Jensen & Murphy, 1998, p. 609). A metaanalysis of CEO pay studies found that firm size more so than performance significantly
influenced CEO pay. That is, the bigger the firm the larger the executive pay packet (Tosi,
Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). Additionally Tosi et al., (2000, p. 329) argue that their
findings are consistent with,
“those theoretical explanations that emphasize organizational size as an important
determinant of total CEO pay; that is, indicators of firm size, taken together, explain
almost nine times the amount of variance in total CEO pay than the most highly
correlated performance measure.”
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BP was no exception and achieved its conglomerate status when the then CEO Lord Browne
financially engineered massive takeovers and mergers of other large oil companies, including
AMOCO in 1998 (previously Standard Oil). This transaction of $US31 billion was the largest
financial transaction in history (at the time), as BP massively increased its ordinary shares
from 2 billion pounds to 12 billion pounds (Amoco and BP Oil, 1998), thus making BP more
beholden to its shareholders and the financial markets. Boyer (2005, p.9) argues that
“financial market-related incentives, supposed to discipline managers, have entitled them to
convert their intrinsic power into remuneration and wealth, both at micro and macro level.
This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of executives with financiers, who have exploited
the long-run erosion of wage earners”.

As banks and corporate advisors were reaping huge fees 10 associated with these large
transactions, BP’s accountants began slashing maintenance and firing over 10,000 employees
including experienced engineers and oil men (Bower, 2009). A review of BP’s annual reports
(2001-2010) reveal that there were 115,250 employees in 2002, but by 2010 employee
numbers were slashed to 79,700 (reduced by 35,550 employees or 31%) with termination
payments of $166 million in 2010, $945 million in 2009 and $669 million in 2008. At the
same time Lord Browne’s bonuses, shares and options increased from $US2.8 million salary
and bonuses, 472,500 shares and 1,269,843 options in 2001 to $US5 million salary and
bonuses, 474,384 shares and 2,006,767 options in 2006. Shareholders including senior
executives (capital) were the winners but the BP workers, and genuine long term
sustainability (labour and society), were the losers as globalised capital ignores workers’
rights proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Investigative historian Tom
10

Estimated fees and expenses incurred or to be incurred by BP in connection with the 1998 Merger are
approximately $80 million (Amoco and BP Oil, 1998).
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Bower (2009) writes:
After his appointment as BP boss in 1998, Lord Browne swiftly transformed the firm
from a dying oil corporation with just two fields - in Alaska and the North Sea - into
the world’s second largest behemoth. By re-focusing on so-called elephants (the big
oil reservoirs) and ruthlessly cutting costs, his mastery of financial engineering used
BP’s rising share price to launch audacious take-overs of failing oil companies,
especially in America. His success earned worldwide plaudits. After re-branding BP
as Beyond Petroleum - the world’s most environmentally friendly oil company - he
boasted during visits to Washington that BP was not only the largest producer of oil in
America, but also the most successful explorer in the Gulf of Mexico, one of the most
difficult places to extract oil. …
His philosophy was ‘more for less’: operations would be completed at a cost that was
10 per cent cheaper than the previous time, and so on. Taking his cue from New
Labour, targets became the Holy Grail. In July 2000, he announced that production
would annually grow over three years by 5.5 to 7 per cent, mostly in the Gulf of
Mexico and Angola. This optimism was hailed and BP’s share price soared. But, in
fact, BP’s growth turned out to be only 2.9 per cent and BP could hit its targets only
by more ruthless cost-cutting.
Hundreds of engineers were sacked. Budgets for safety and maintenance were slashed.
Skilled oil men resigned in disgust. While Lord Browne was busy rebranding BP with
a new ‘green’ logo (a typically vacuous - and expensive - New Labour gimmick),
Doug Ford, an American responsible for BP’s refineries, attacked what he believed
was an increasingly badly-run organisation. After Lord Browne ignored his warnings
about the consequences of cost-cutting, Mr Ford resigned and others followed. …
Unwilling to tolerate criticism, Lord Browne favoured only ‘the turtles’ - the
sycophants trusted to deliver his targets. Tony Hayward was one of the chosen ones.
Meanwhile, Mr Ford was replaced by John Manzoni, an accountant and Lord Browne
‘turtle’ with little understanding of the complicated engineering skills required to run
refineries properly. And to satisfy Lord Browne’s ‘more for less’ mantra, Mr
Manzoni 11 zealously pruned safety and maintenance costs.
Upon taking the CEO helm Tony Hayward (2007-2010) 12 continued with a culture of cost
cutting, reduced oversight and engaged in greater risk taking. He took BP into the Canadian
tar sands, one of the most environmentally destructive methods of extracting oil on earth,
destroying the lands of the First Nations peoples. While shutting down BP’s alternative
energy headquarters in London in 2009, he significantly expanded BP’s offshore operations
11

Mr Manzoni was fired by the Board in 2006 (along with Lord Browne) as a consequence of the 2005 Texas
oil refinery explosion.
12
On 27 July 2010 BP released a statement that Tony Hayward was stepping down as CEO. He would receive
about $17 million in severance and pension payments, and was appointed to the board of BP’s Russian
partnership, TNK-BP (Juhasz, 2011). Bob Dudley is now the CEO.
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in Canada, Egypt, Trinidad, as well as Angola and Azerbaijan – among the world’s most
repressive and corrupt governments. Hayward also expanded operations in the GOM, where
it partners with every major oil company, e.g. ExxonMobil, Chevron and BHP Billiton
(Juhasz, 2011).

Hence, other oil companies are no better. A United Nations Environmental Programme
Report (2011) exposed the full horrors of a half a century of oil production in Nigeria leaving
extensive environmental, social, economic and health damage. Moreover the report (2011, p.
139) found similar regulatory flaws where
“… there is clearly a conflict of interest in a (Nigerian) ministry which, on one hand,
has to maximize revenue by increasing production and, on the other, ensure
environmental compliance. Most countries around the world, including in the Middle
East where oil is the mainstay of the regional economy, have placed environmental
regulation within the Ministry of Environment or equivalent. It is noteworthy to
mention in this context that after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident, it came to
light that the US Offshore Energy & Minerals Management Office (under the Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement) responsible for the
development of the offshore oilfield was also the body that issued environmental
approvals.”

Spills in the U.S. however, “are responded to in minutes; in the Niger delta, which suffers
more pollution each year than the Gulf of Mexico, it can take companies weeks or more”
(Vidal, 2011). Shell Oil as one of the biggest oil producers in Nigeria is currently being sued
in the British courts by Nigerian complainants for the destruction of the Niger River delta and
its fisheries, a valuable livelihoods and food source of hundreds of thousands of people.
Insidiously, organised crime has moved into the Niger Delta where Russian Gangsters swap
arms with war lords for illegal bunkered oil, thus destroying progress and development for all
Nigerian society (Vidal, 2011). Additionally the BBC (15 February, 2011) reported Chevron
Oil was successfully sued.
“A court in Ecuador has fined US oil giant Chevron $US8.6bn (£5.3bn) for polluting a
large part of the country's Amazon region. The oil firm Texaco, which merged with
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Chevron in 2001, was accused of dumping billions of gallons of toxic materials into
unlined pits and Amazon rivers. Campaigners say crops were damaged and farm
animals killed, and that local cancer rates increased. … The lawsuit was brought on
behalf of 30,000 Ecuadoreans, in a case which dragged on for nearly two decades. The
plaintiffs said the company’s activities had destroyed large areas of rainforest and also
led to an increased risk of cancer among the local population.”
The capital markets however, do not seem to have noticed Shell and Chevron’s unethical oil
production practices in developing countries. By contrast, BP was punished as its share price
dropped dramatically within days of the Deepwater Horizon disaster in April 2010. Share
price materiality would suggest that oil spills in developing countries (and associated
investments in safety measures in those countries) are immaterial. Such information need not
be disclosed and therefore is considered to be unimportant.

3.2 BP’s disingenuous sustainability
BP provided voluntary sustainability reviews that some stakeholders believed to be the result
of capitalist enlightened self-interest. As Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007, p. 339) point out
though:
“… for other stakeholders who do not accept this narrative, realisation that enlightened
self-interest of corporations has not resulted in, or guaranteed that, business expert
systems operate in a manner which does not damage aspects of society and/or the
environment, can render ineffective business claims that their voluntary action should
be trusted to protect the social and ecological interests of a wide range of
stakeholders.”

In fact Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007) argue the business case for the regulation of corporate
social and environmental reporting, as a way to enhance both stakeholder and shareholder
value by ensuring credible and transparent reporting. To support their case Unerman and
O’Dwyer (2007, p. 347) provide the example of the BP Texas City refinery explosion in
2005, even though BP had proclaimed safety and responsible operating supported by
advanced audits in the prior years’ sustainability reports.
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Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007) cite the scathing report by the Panel (2007). The report stated
that while BP had ‘aspirational goals’ of no accidents and no harm, the company had not
provided an effective leadership or a process of safety as a core value across its five refineries
in the US. Further BP had not effectively shown that it held senior executives, line managers
and supervisors accountable for safety performance across its five US refineries. The report
pointed out several other weaknesses with BP’s safety performance, in contrast to the
portrayal in its sustainability reports of a company genuinely committed to the safety of its
workforce.
“Where events such as the BP Texas City Refinery explosion occur which shed light
on an underlying reality which seems to be at variance with the image portrayed by the
glossy SEAR, this calls into question the credibility of the SEAR” (Unerman &
O’Dwyer, 2007, p. 347).

BP’s oil spill and other major accidents in recent years indicates the failure of corporate
sustainability reporting; and that BP’s sustainability reporting is no more than greenwash to
mimic genuine environmental and social commitment by a company mired in scandals and
the dirty business of oil exploration and extraction. BP’s bad record on environmental issues
resonates with Gray’s (1992) argument that “the roots of modern (especially Western) society
are essentially incommensurable both with continued survival and with any set of values
other than those of (very) short-term (human and economic) self-interest (p.399). Further, a
search of BP’s 2009 sustainability review revealed ‘sustainability’ was mentioned over a
thousand times; hence sustainability loses its imprimatur and becomes a ‘catch’ word that
suggests more BP’s un-sustainability. BP’s liberal but devalued use of the word sustainability
is symptomatic of the contestability of sustainability and what it really means. Gray’s (2010)
concern about the un-sustainability of “western, expansive and financial capital” starts a
discourse of a more nuanced understanding of sustainability and its troubled relationship with
modernity, particularly modern science. Ironically modern science aided in the development

33

of the technologies that allowed BP to drill for oil in very deep water that resulted in the
largest and most catastrophic oil spill in US history.

The greenwash in BP’s commitment to sustainability is portrayed as highly responsible in
regards to health, safety and the environment.
“BP operates globally according to a system of internal control that extends from
corporate governance policies at board level to detailed processes that are applied in
our operations. … The board is responsible for the direction and oversight of BP p.l.c.
on behalf of shareholders; it is accountable to them, as owners, for all aspects of BP’s
business. The board sets the tone from the top, and has established a set of board
governance principles, which delegate management authority to the group chief
executive (GCE) within defined limits. These include a requirement that the GCE will
not engage in any activity without regard to health, safety and environmental
consequence. On 1 January 2010, the board was composed of the chairman, eight nonexecutive directors and five executive directors.
The board maintains five permanent committees that are composed entirely of nonexecutives. They include the audit committee, the remuneration committee and the
safety, ethics and environment assurance committee (SEEAC). Monitoring the GCE’s
identification and management of the group’s risks – both financial and non-financial –
is conducted through the board and its committees. SEEAC monitors non-financial
risk, which includes regular reviews of information and reports from the safety and
operations function. It also acts for the board in working with the Independent Expert
to review the progress made in implementing the recommendations of the BP US
Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel 13.” (BP sustainability review, 2009, p. 5)

BP’s system of internal controls to monitor safety, health and the environment is flawed - and
is just that, internally self-regulated by a few directors with little transparency or critical
external review about the processes. When then BP spokesman Mark Salt, was questioned
about the company’s safety record in the Gulf he noted that according to the MMS Incident
of Non-Compliance (INC) data, Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon has had an unblemished
safety record since 2004. MMS figures also show that BP drilling rigs in the GOM
outperformed the industry average on safety for six years running. BP had also been a finalist
for the MMS National Safety Award for Excellence for the past two years, supporting their

13

This Panel was appointed as a result of BP’s 2005 Texas refinery explosion that killed and maimed workers.
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reputation for pushing the frontiers of offshore drilling and making it pay for their
shareholders (Sutherland, 2010).

The alarm bells however, had been ringing for a long time. Green groups and ethical
investment funds have endeavoured to question the company for more details on the
environmental and social risks it was taking (Monbiot, 2010) for many years. Due to
concerns about the company, in 2002, Henderson Global Investors withdrew BP from its
socially responsible investment funds after one of its analysts conducted his own research
into the safety risks that BP were taking in Alaska. Generation Investment Management, cofounded by David Blood and Al Gore, deemed BP to no longer be a suitable investment when
Lord Browne stepped down as BP’s chief in 2007, to be replaced by Tony Hayward who did
not embrace its transition from a petroleum company to an energy company (Van Dyck,
2010). Similarly, Walden Asset Management also made an early call on BP’s risky behaviour
liquidating its investment after the Texas City refinery accident.

3.3 BP and the aftermath of GOM oil spill
While the GOM oil spill has had an unprecedented impact on the human health, environment
and wild life of the region, perhaps the most insidious impact was “the cure being, in many
ways, worse than the disease” (Juhasz, 2011, p. 89). In an attempt to deal with the
approximately 5 million barrels of oil and 500,000 tons of gas released into the Gulf, BP used
more than 1.8 million gallons of toxic chemical dispersants, which were mixed into the water
and sprayed from the air, to disperse the oil. Dispersants however, do not remove the oil they
simply disperse it throughout the water.
BP chose the type of dispersants and made the decision to use them. The coast guard
and the EPA authorized its use in the face of great opposition, including by the EPA’s
own scientists (Juhasz, 2011, p. 97).
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As detailed by Juhasz (2011), BP first used Corexit 9527A, a highly toxic formula designated
by the EPA as a chronic and acute health hazard. Corexit 9527A has been identified as the
cause of chronic health problems and even several deaths amongst the clean-up workers of
the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. Intense public pressure regarding its use, led the EPA to
require a less toxic formula. Hence BP switched to Corexit 9500, which is also toxic to
humans and a known animal carcinogen. Both of these dispersants are known to
bioaccumulate up the food chain, thereby their impacts could last for at least twenty years or
even longer. For the first time ever and without testing its effects, BP also used these
dispersants subsurface at the wellhead, without approval from the EPA, in a major
experiment as it grappled to deal with the magnitude of the disaster. At least 410 fires were
also ignited on the water’s surface by BP, the MMS and the coast guard to burn the oil away,
causing further pollution. None of these impacts have been reported in the 2010 Annual
Report or Sustainability Review once again indicating greenwash by the new management.

Kendall (2011) also reported that in the wake of the GOM oil spill a global coalition of fund
managers, led by the US based Christian Brothers Investment Services and including the
Ecumenical Council for Corporate Responsibility (United Kingdom) and the Ethos
Foundation (Switzerland), formed as a group of investors to vote against BP’s 2010 Annual
Report and accounts at the company’s annual general meeting in London in April, 2011. The
coalitions’ main concern was the lack of sufficient detail to assist in determining “how the
company’s safety and risk management function has been strengthened; how it is being
evaluated, managed, and mitigated; how the board will oversee it; and how progress is to be
assessed and measured,…as well as BP’s remuneration proposal and key board positions,
particularly members of the Safety Committee” (p.1). In an attached seven page assessment
of the BP 2010 Annual Report, the coalition was critical of a lack of substantial new
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information in four main areas of concern being; Health and Safety, Remediation of the Gulf
Oil Spill, Transition to a Low Carbon Economy and Board oversight. The assessment noted
that “It is critical that BP demonstrate its understanding that the spill was not the result of
human failure, but failure by BP to create adequate systems to prevent it” (p.2).

Conclusion
This paper has examined the underlying reasons that predisposed BP’s disastrous accident
resulting in millions of gallons of oil spilt into the GOM, a prime habitat for sea life. We have
provided evidence that marketized public governance failed in its duty to protect society and
the natural environment which were sacrificed for the exploration and extraction of oil.
Instead the marketized public governance protected the markets from society, rather than
protecting society from the pernicious aspects of the markets. Evidence also indicates that
private governance failed, that is BP’s board and its various sub-committees charged with
monitoring the safety, health and the natural environment failed in their responsibilities. BP’s
Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion killed 11 workers, spilt millions of gallons of oil into the
ocean for 86 days, closing down the largest fishing grounds in the U.S., killing unprecedented
numbers of wildlife, loss of income for the local population and long term health concerns
from the toxic cleanup. The picture described in the BP annual reports (2001-2010) and
sustainability reviews that of an upstanding corporate citizen caring for its people and the
natural environment is in tatters. BP’s greenwash will forever be stained by the dirty and unsustainable business of oil exploration and extraction.
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